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Incidental findings and the right not to know in clinical setting: 
Constitutional perspectives 
Alessia-Ottavia Cozzi 
ABSTRACT: Next generation sequencing (NGS) induces frequent discoveries of 
incidental findings. This means that, during the sequencing, primary information 
concerning the alteration in gene for which the sequencing test was ordered goes 
with other information on different alterations. This problem is first faced by 
laboratories, followed by clinicians. The core question is whether to inform patients 
of those alterations. The first part of this paper overviews the guidelines adopted by 
the scientific community to set incidental findings. References are made to the 2016 
European Guidelines for Diagnostic NGS, U.S. Recommendations adopted in 2013 
and revised twice, in 2015 and in 2016, Italian Report of Bioethics Committee of 
2016, and French Guidelines on secondary findings related to cancer gene of 2018. 
The second part of this paper discusses the rationale of “the right not to know” and 
analyses two main frameworks: autonomy and privacy. An attempt is made to 
consider the issue through different constitutional backgrounds: the U.S. and French 
notion of autonomy and freedom, and the Italian constitutional background. This 
paper argues that the right not to know is a negative right comprising a denial, but 
whose exercise requires positive obligations from clinicians to fulfil an effective and 
conscious choice. Recalling a famous U.S. debate on negative and positive liberty, a 
synthesis of the two sides could be managed through a procedural setting of consent, 
including information about family members. In this sense, the right not to know 
refers to a constitutional pattern of principles that is not limited to self-
determination but entails solidarity and responsibility. 
KEYWORDS: Incidental findings; Genome sequencing; Autonomy; Privacy; Negative and 
positive liberties 
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framework – 10. (continue) The right not to know under Italian constitutional law – 11. The positive side of the 
right not to know: Consent – 12. Conclusions: Double consent as a nudge. 
1. Introduction 
he right not to know” questions some deeply rooted principles underlying 
constitutionalism – the idea to change our lives through human will and action. The 
evolution of technology and science faces borders, where knowledge refusal, at the 
given state of understanding and depending on intimate and private beliefs, probably is the best 
chance to organise a worthy life. Concurrently, such an intimate decision is inextricably intertwined 
with others, family members whose relation could be good or bad, as always in life. This paper 
argues that exercising “the right not to know” reflects autonomy but refuses isolation and calls for 
solidarity and responsibility. In this framework, there is a positive obligation of public authorities to 
set appropriate measures through which everyone can manage his faith and expectations for how his 
life is supposed to be. 
This paper explores incidental findings in a clinical setting. Managing them raises different problems 
in both clinics and research, and even if the borders between research and clinic are increasingly 
blurring, we concentrate only on clinical aspects.1 Also, this paper does not discuss issues concerning 
minors and third parties other than family members. 
 
1 The main differences between incidental findings in clinical and research settings are as follows: genome 
sequencing for clinical diagnosis primarily entails protecting the individual patient’s health, so an examination 
ordered for clinical reasons involves evaluations on prevention or treatment; the interests of others, 
particularly family members, are much more compelling in clinical practise than in research activity; genomic 
analysis performed for health research sometimes lacks the same sensitivity and quality criteria (depth and 
coverage) as that performed in a healthcare context. The main point for incidental findings in research seems 
to be the opportunity or duty of recontact, depending on the scale of the study, the object - rare diseases or 
not - and the formula of initial consent. See J. VIBERG, M.G. HANSSON, S. LANGENSKIÖLD, P. SEGERDAHL, Incidental 
Findings: The Time Is not yet Ripe for a Policy for Biobanks, in D. MASCALZONI (ed.), Ethics, Law and Governance 
of Biobanking, Heidelberg, 2015, 121-131, and, in Italian literature, M. TOMASI, Genetica e Costituzione. Esercizi 
di eguaglianza, solidarietà e responsabilità, Napoli, 2019, 245 ff. On the right not to know in research, S. M. 
WOLF, J. PARADISE, C. CAGA-ANAN, The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Establishing 
Researchers’ Duties, in Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 36, 2, 2008, 361-383; B.M. KNOPPERS, From the Right 
to Know to the Right Not to Know, in Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, special issue no. 1, 2014, 1-10, who 
notes that “no return” policies adopted by large population genome studies, for example, P3G, on 23 national 
biobanks, have been integrated with new options of consent upon recontact of participants, because the 
increasing use of WGS caused the discovery of unsolicited information such as rare mutations or clinically 
significant incidental findings, blurring the distinction between research and clinical contexts. Nevertheless, the 
borders between research and clinics in the matter still exist. See European Society of Human Genetics’ 
Guidelines for diagnostic next-generation sequencing, in European Journal of Human Genetics, 24, 2016, 2-5, 5, 
on “Distinction between Research and Diagnostic”, Statements no. 32-38. Recently, the American College of 
Medical Genetics and Genomics gave a statement to forbid using their clinical recommendations for incidental 
findings for general population screening because any of the ACMG SF v2.0 genes, as quoted later, have 
uncertain penetrance when identified in asymptomatic individuals (e.g. SCN5A and Brugada syndrome). In the 
absence of penetrance data that can only be obtained through robust genotype-phenotype correlation, the 
medical ethical principle of nonmaleficence should dominate, in The use of ACMG secondary findings 
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The first part of this paper overviews current guidelines and recommendations adopted by the 
scientific community to set incidental findings. References are made to the 2016 European 
Guidelines for Diagnostic Next Generation Sequencing (NGS), U.S. Recommendations adopted in 
2013 and revised twice, in 2015 and in 2016, Italian Report of Bioethics Committee of 2016, and 
French Guidelines on secondary finding related to cancer gene of 2018. A comparison is made on the 
procedures adopted to define the guidelines and to their content by considering clinicians’ 
viewpoints (types of variations and actionability) and patients’ viewpoints (right not to know). In this 
first part we will use both the acronyms IFs, incidental findings, present in the Italian Report, and SFs, 
secondary findings, where U.S. Guidelines since the 2015 version and French Guidelines refer 
specifically to secondary findings, as we will better explain later. 
The second part of this paper discusses the rationale of “the right not to know” by analysing two 
main frameworks having a great echo between scholars: autonomy and privacy. Subsequently, an 
attempt is made to consider the issue through different constitutional backgrounds: the U.S. and 
French notion of autonomy and freedom, and the Italian constitutional framework. Constitutional 
traditions are relevant because the clinician–patient relationship mirrors an individual’s position in 
society and the relation with power. The common tread chosen is the negative and positive way “the 
right not to know” is framed. The two aspects, in our opinion, do not create dichotomy, but 
coexistence – the positive side setting the condition to fulfil the negative one. Hence, this paper 
argues that “the right not to know” is a negative right comprising a denial, but whose exercise 
requires positive obligations from clinicians to fulfil an effective and conscious choice. Recalling a 
famous U.S. debate on negative and positive liberty, synthesising the two sides could be managed 
through a procedural setting of consent, including information about family members. In this sense, 
“the right not to know” refers to a constitutional pattern of principles that is not limited to self-
determination but entails solidarity and responsibility. 
2. Incidental findings in clinical setting: A scientific overview 
Next Generation Sequencing2 and the increasing use of multi-panel analysis in clinical practise to 
discover genes responsible for main diseases induces frequent discoveries of incidental findings. This 
means that, during the sequencing, primary information concerning the alteration in gene for which 
the sequencing test was ordered goes with other information on different alterations. Geneticists 
 
Genetics and Genomics (ACMG), in Genetics in Medicine, 2019 (21), 1467-1468, and the ongoing debate that 
followed. In contrast, French Guidelines, as quoted later, 1736, 1738, concern both somatic analyses performed 
in healthcare context for research, and the provided consent forms too. For a recent example of management 
in research, see le dossier Comment donner suite aux découvertes fortuites significatives. Lignes directrices sur 
l’application de l’article 3.4 EPTC 2 (2018), Group consultative en éthique de la recherche, 2019, in 
https://ethics.gc.ca/fra/incidental_findings.html. 
2 See the introduction of European Society of Human Genetics’ Guidelines for diagnostic next-generation 
sequencing: “Next generation sequencing (NGS) allows for the fast generation of thousands to millions of base 
pairs of DNA sequence of an individual patient. The relatively fast emergence and the great success of these 
technologies in research herald a new era in genetic diagnostics. However, the new technologies bring 
challenges, both at the technical and in terms of data management, as well as for the interpretation of the 
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usually divide IFs into different categories: fortuitous or secondary. Fortuitous findings are 
completely unexpected, accidental and non-predictable results, while secondary findings are 
predictable results, i.e. they can be expected as a part of the results, even if they are unrelated to the 
primary research of alteration.3 The problem is first faced by laboratories, followed by clinicians. The 
core question is whether to inform patients of those alterations. 
IFs are well known in the fields of medicine other than genetics. For example, radiographs for a 
particular anatomical focus can report abnormal findings in regions not indicated as the primary 
reason for investigation. Although it is generally argued that there is a right of the patient to know 
this information and a duty of the clinician to report them to protect the patient’s health, the same 
pattern may not be suitable for genome IFs. Many differences exist between radiographic images 
and genetic information regarding predictability of the information and interpretation, both 
technically and clinically.4 Furthermore, patient could avoid obtaining genetic information for many 
reasons. Learning to be at risk of genetic disease may induce anxiety, depression, changes in self-
image, reduced capacity to organise the future or even stigmatisation and discrimination.5 Moreover, 
the desire for ignorance could rely on economic and social conditions, concerns about the costs of 
therapies, or the fear of being a burden to others.  
Few recommendations have been adopted in Europe to manage IFs, and scientific publications have 
shown variabilities in European practices for transmitting incidental information both from 
laboratories to clinicians and from clinicians to the patient. A need for common guidelines emerged 
to help molecular laboratories and clinician physicians harmonise their practice, particularly for 
cancer-related genes, and to assure equal access and uniform service across Europe.6 
 
3 We will see later that U.S. Guidelines and French Guidelines refer to secondary findings, while the Italian 
Bioethics Committee use the term “incidental findings” because it is common in international debate: Report 
Gestione degli “incidental findings” nelle indagini genomiche con le nuove piattaforme tecnologiche, 17 marzo 
2016, http://bioetica.governo.it/media/1803/p123_2016_incidental_findings_it.pdf, 11, note no. 23. 
4 See French Guidelines for reporting secondary findings of genome sequencing in cancer gene: the SFMPP 
recommendations, in European Journal of Human Genetics, 26, 2018, 1732-1742, spec. 1737, admitting that the 
sensitivity of variant detection may vary among genes according to the coverage and depth of the sequencing 
process. Thus, the coverage and depth at the position of the gene of interest will differ from that of genes 
secondarily and deliberately studied. This concern could induce misinterpretation of the results by the clinician 
and/or the patient, such as the absence of a pathogenic variant in secondarily studied genes. Therefore, the 
French Guidelines suggest reporting the conditions of sequencing and analysis of secondary data if it differs 
from that of the primary data. Similarly, see European Society of Human Genetics’ Guidelines, cit., “The 
implications of diagnostic test based on NGS depend on the procedures, platforms, filtering processes and data 
storage used in the laboratory. It is crucial that the referring physician is fully informed about the limitations 
and possible unfortunate effects of a genetic testing”. 
5 R. CHADWICK, The Philosophy of the Right to Know and the Right Not to Know, in R. CHADWICK, M. LEVITT, D. 
SHICKLE (eds.), The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know. Genetic Privacy and Responsibility, Cambridge, 
1997, 13-22, spec. 18. 
6 French Guidelines, cit., 1733, quoting D. F. VEARS, K. SENECAL, P. BORRY, Reporting practices for unsolicited and 
secondary findings from next-generation sequencing technologies: Perspectives of laboratory personnel, in 
Human Mutation, 38, 2017, 905-911, for variability in transmitting information from laboratories to clinicians, 
and J. Y. HEHIR-KWA, M. CLAUSTRES, R. J. HASTINGS, C. VAN RAVENSWAAIJ-ARTS, G. CHRISTENHUSZ, M. GENUARDI et al., 
Towards a European consensus for reporting incidental findings during clinical NGS testing, in European Journal 
of Human Genetics, 23, 2015, 1601-1606, from clinicians to patients. For the need of common guidelines, see C. 
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Here the issue is addressed by analysing different sets of recommendations adopted in the U.S., Italy, 
France and at the European level by the European Society of Human Genetics. It will be useful to 
start from the European level, which demonstrates a lack of common vision for IFs. The 2016 
European Society’s Guidelines on Diagnostic NGS recognise that the main implication of a diagnostic 
test based on NGS is the chance of unsolicited and secondary findings. To face the problem, under 
the paragraph “Informed consent and information to the patient and clinician”, Statement no. 9 
suggested focusing on the gene panel under investigation because the chance of unsolicited findings 
in a gene panel is very low and mainly depends on the genes involved. However, if the unsolicited 
information occurs, choice is given to each laboratory, institute or to authorities at the national level, 
whether patients are offered opt-in, opt-out options to get additional information. The only 
recommendation is that laboratories disclose the chance of unsolicited findings and set up 
“unsolicited and secondary finding protocols”, which must agree with the decision of an ethical 
committee. Each protocol should specify whether unsolicited findings are reported and, in that case, 
provide for pre-test genetic counselling, including a discussion on both expected results and the 
potential for unsolicited and secondary findings, local policies assuring clear dissemination for 
patients.7 Overall, adopting opt-in and opt-out policies on IFs is discretionary. A definitive settlement 
of the interests at stake has not been established, and the balance between the task to report and 
the desire of the patient remains open. We will see that this setting has been discussed at the 
national level on both sides of the Atlantic. 
3. U.S., Italian and French Guidelines on disclosing secondary findings: Scope of application 
and working procedures 
After a strong scientific debate in 2013, the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics 
adopted guidelines (in the following, U.S. Guidelines) concerning secondary findings.8 For their 
organic and influential attempt to set the issue, U.S. Guidelines induced discussion in the scientific 
 
healthcare: Recommendations of the European Society of Human Genetics, in European Journal of Human 
Genetics, 21, 2013, 580-584, and M. CLAUSTRES, V. KOZICH, E. DEQUEKER, B. FOWLER, J.Y. HEHIR-KWA, K. MILLER et al., 
Recommendations for reporting results of diagnostic genetic testing (biochemical, cytogenetic and molecular 
genetic), in European Journal of Human Genetics, 22, 2014, 160-170. Many governments have drawn up plans 
to develop and generalise the use of large-scale genetic analysis, such as the UK (100,000 Genomes Project), 
Iceland, Estonia (Estonian Genome Project), France (Genomic Medicine France 2025), The Netherlands 
(Genome of The Netherlands Project), and Germany (National Genome Research Network). In this dynamic, it 
is likely that IFs become frequent and a harmonisation of practices to better care for the patient has become 
necessary. 
7 European Society of Human Genetics’ Guidelines, cit., 3-4, Statements no. 10, 11 and 12, under “Informed 
consent and information to the patient and clinician”; under “Reporting”: all pathogenic (class 5) and likely 
pathogenic (class 3) variants have to be reported. Whether or not Unclassified Variants (UVs. class 3) are 
reported will depend on local practice, which has to be clear for the laboratory scientist and the referring 
clinician. Statement no. 29 re-clarifies that laboratories should have a clearly defined protocol for addressing 
unsolicited and secondary findings before launching test. 
8 ACMG recommendations for reporting of incidental findings in clinical exome and genome sequencing, 
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community. They have been revised in 20159 and 201610 and, in the last version, they listed 59 
medically actionable genes recommended for return in clinical genomic sequencing (four genes were 
added to the first list and one removed). 
In Europe, no common approach was observed. In Italy, since 2007 the Italian Data Protection 
Authority gave general provisions on genetic data processing for clinical and research purposes. The 
aim of this regulation, as defined by the Italian Data Protection Code, was to govern all stages of 
genetic data processing, from the initial information, to consent, communication and dissemination. 
The problem of unexpected results was addressed within the more general definition of data 
processing.11 In 2016, the National Committee for Bioethics followed the American debate, adopting 
a specific Report on Management of Incidental Findings in genomic sequencings with new 
technological platforms. As U.S. Guidelines, to define IFs, the Committee referred to the 2013 report 
of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, which divided the findings into 
primary (related to the primary investigation), secondary (anticipable results, so results that the 
sequencing is looking for) and discovery (non-anticipable results, fortuitous).12 
 
9 ACMG policy statement: Updated recommendations regarding analysis and reporting of secondary findings in 
clinical genome-scale sequencing, in Genetics in Medicine, 17, 1, 2015, 68-69. 
10 Recommendations for reporting of secondary findings in clinical exome and genome sequencing, 2016 update 
(ACMG SF v2.0): A policy statement of the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics, published on 17 
November 2016, in Genetics in Medicine, 19, 2, 2017, 249-255, so called ACMG SF v2.0 or “ACMG 59”. Original 
version of 2013 uses the term “incidental findings”. In 2015 the Recommendations were first revised, adopting 
the term “secondary findings” “because these genes are intentionally being analysed, as opposed to genetic 
variations found incidentally or accidentally”; the shift in terminology, it is said, also maintained consistency 
with a recommendation by Presidential Commission on Bioethical Issues, C. WEINER, Anticipate and 
communicate: Ethical management of incidental and secondary findings in the clinical, research, and direct-to-
consumer contexts, December 2013, Report of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, in 
American Journal of Epidemiology, 180, 2014, 562-564. 
11 The Italian Data Protection Authority (“Garante per la Privacy”, DPA in the following) is an independent 
administrative authority established by law no. 675 of 31 December 1996 and regulated subsequently by the 
Personal Data Protection Code, Legislative Decree no. 196 of 30 June 2003. Before the entry into force of the 
EU Data Protection Regulation no. 2016/679, the processing of genetic data under Italian law was governed by 
a so called “general authorisation” issued by the DPA, pursuant to Art. 90 of Legislative Decree no. 196 of 2003, 
under which the requirements and conditions laid down in the authorisation were the only cases in which 
processing was allowed. The position and force of the authorisation in the hierarchy of sources gave rise to a 
wide-ranging debate concerning its assimilation to the law. The first version of the general authorisation dates 
back to 2007 and was significantly amended in 2011, with renewals up to 2016 
(www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/5803688). As will be seen in 
more detail below, one of the most significant changes introduced since 2011 concerned precisely the 
possibility of allowing the processing of genetic data carried out to protect the health of family members 
without the consent of the data subject, and the disclosure to family members of genetic data indispensable to 
prevent harm to their health. Legislative Decree no. 101 of 10 August 2018 amended the Code and established 
that the Italian DPA is the supervisory authority responsible for monitoring application of the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation, pursuant to its Art. 51. The general authorisation no. 8 of 2016 has been replaced by the 
no. 146 of 2019, www.garanteprivacy.it/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/9124510 (last visited on 19 
April 2021). 
12 Report Gestione degli “incidental findings” nelle indagini genomiche con le nuove piattaforme tecnologiche, 
17 marzo 2016, cit.; the Italian National Committee of Bioethics refers to statements of its previous report of 
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An attempt to generalise secondary findings in genome sequencing has been made in France. In 
2017, the French Society for Predictive and Personalised Medicine (Société Française de Médecine 
Prédictive et Personnalisée, SFMPP in the following) organised ad hoc working groups to identify 
secondary findings (données secondaires) implications and treatments, and in 2018, the French 
Guidelines were published (in the following also SFMPP Recommendations).13 They were expressed 
regarding an extensive European genome project and aimed at providing a first step towards 
standardised guidelines in France and all Europe. 
We will focus briefly on the scope of application and the procedure of adoption of the U.S., French 
Guidelines and the Italian Bioethics Committee’s Report. 
Concerning the scope of application, all documents aim at giving indications, without limiting or 
substituting the judgment of the clinician, whose adherence to recommendations is voluntary. The 
U.S. Guidelines self-define as an “educational resource”, and both U.S. and French text refer to the 
professional, clinical and ethical evaluation of the practitioner, depending on the specific clinical 
circumstances presented by the individual patient.14 
Regarding the adoption procedure, the Italian Report, due to the composition and tasks of the 
Bioethics Committee, does not enter detailed discussion on the type of genetic variations, while the 
U.S. and French Guidelines are the results of a participatory procedure, between the medical 
community in the U.S., and more extensively between clinicians, experts in bioethics, philosophers, 
sociologists and lawyers in France, both aiming at classifying variations and their management. In 
detail, the U.S. list of pathogenic variations was composed following a bottom-up process. The 
Secondary Findings Working Group (SFWG) created by ACMG and other colleagues collected 
information in a nomination form. Completed forms were reviewed in a study section-like model and 
by another working group. Each form was presented in an SFWG meeting or conference called by the 
submitter or a designee and discussed. After discussion, SFWG members voted on whether to accept 
the submitter’s recommendation. Nominations recommended by the SFWG were sent to ACMG 
Board of Directors with a summary of the SFWG discussion, voting outcome, and a recommendation 
for the suggested change to the SF minimum list. 
In France, from June 2016 to May 2017, the SFMPP established a working group of 47 experts to 
elaborate guidelines for managing SFs for cancer-related genes. The experts were divided into two 
subgroups regarding ethical and legal questions and medical expertise. The ethical and legal group 
comprised 17 members, psychologists, sociologists, ethicists, methodologists, lawyers and members 
of patients’ associations, to elaborate general recommendations on information related to patients 
 
genetici di suscettibilità e medicina personalizzata, in http://bioetica.governo.it/media/4045/test-genetici-
sulla-suscettibilita.pdf, confirming the distinction between research and clinical activity, and the distinction 
between minors and adults. 
13 See Guidelines for reporting secondary findings of genome sequencing in cancer gene: The SFMPP 
recommendations, in European Journal of Human Genetics, 26, 2018, 1732-1742. 
14 ACMG SF v2.0, cit., 249; the SFMPP Recommendations, cit., 1739: “The present recommendations are not 
meant to substitute for the clinical and ethical judgement of clinician, but they are proposed as a basis for 
reflection to help with the prescription and the results of the genomic analyses in a homogeneous way. These 
recommendations are not a substitute for a personal bibliographic watch that is an integral part of the 
clinician’s work in a context of continuous improvement of medical knowledge due to the variety of cancer-
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and consent, and to provide informed consent forms and information media tools. The medical 
expertise group comprised 30 members, oncologists, clinical geneticists, molecular biologists, and 
cancer gene experts, who provided independent evaluation and classification of cancer genes for 
cancer risk and actionability.15 To homogenise the results, evaluation criteria were designed on the 
models of the ACMG, with the aim of creating a common global standard. Both U.S. and French 
Guidelines are presented as provisional text, calling for updates and research on the list of variations 
and psychological impact of returning SFs. 
4. (continue) and contents: Types of variations and actionability, the clinician’s viewpoint 
As we said, due to the composition and tasks of the National Bioethics Committee, the Italian Report 
did not aim at distinguishing types of variations, while both U.S. and French Recommendations 
included a detailed list of variants. Both considered differences in genetic variations: pathogenic 
(causative) mutations, polymorphisms, variations that can be found also in healthy people. Both 
recommended restricting the report of SFs to pathogenic variations, providing a list considered 
“minimal”, and open to regular update.16 
Moreover, both rely on the concept of actionability (données secondaires actionnables in French) or 
clinical utility. We will see that actionability is the comet guiding clinicians’ perspective. 
Broadly speaking, utility measures the personal benefit that someone has from an intervention, 
outcome, product or process, and medical clinical utility describes the relevance and usefulness of an 
intervention in patient care.17 The meaning of “clinical utility” adopted by both U.S. and French 
Guidelines refers to the existence of preventive measures or treatments.18 Since 2013, the U.S. 
 
15 In detail, the ethical and legal group comprised three psychologists, one sociologist, four ethicists, two 
methodologists, four lawyers and three representatives of patient associations (BRCA France, the Vaincre les 
Maladies Lysosomales association and the Association pour la Prévention, Traitement Etude des Polyposes 
Familiales); the medical group eight oncologists, eleven clinical geneticists, three molecular biologists and eight 
cancer gene experts. 
16 See the SFMPP Recommendations, cit., 1739. ACMG SF v2.0, cit., 251, adopting the classification of variants 
in S. RICHARDS, N. AZIZ, S. BALE ET AL., ACMG Laboratory Quality Assurance Committee. Standards and guidelines 
for the interpretation of sequence variants: A joint consensus recommendation of the American College of 
Medical Genetics and Genomics and the Association for Molecular Pathology, in Genetics in Medicine, 17, 2015, 
405-424. 
17 L. J. LESKO, I. ZINEH, S.-M. HUANG, What Is Clinical Utility and Why Should We Care?, in Clinical Pharmacology & 
Therapeutics, 88, 6, 2010, 729-733. 
18 It seems useful to quote ACMG SF v2.0 on actionability: “Initially, medical actionability was evaluated 
according to a semiquantitative metric that included the following major adjudication criteria: severity of 
disease/nature of the health threat; likelihood of the disease/health threat materializing (i.e., penetrance); 
efficacy of specific intervention(s); and overall strength of the current knowledge base about the 
gene/condition. In July 2015, a fifth criterion was added: acceptability of the proposed intervention based on 
its risks and benefits. The SFWG acknowledged the inherent subjectivity and difficulty of rating any given 
intervention as it applies to an individual but voted unanimously in favour of adding this fifth criterion”. An 
example on evaluation of a pathogenic variation could be read in the same Guidelines, concerning genes added 
to the original list: ATP7B is associated with autosomal-recessive Wilson disease (MIM 277900). Morbidity 
among homozygotes directly correlates with copper deposition in the liver, brain, and eye. The disease is 
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Recommendations admitted that there was much to be learned about disease predictability from 
genomic testing, particularly in asymptomatic individuals. A debate occurred between some arguing 
that IFs should not be reported at all in clinical sequencing until there is strong evidence of benefit, 
and others advocating that variations in any all disease-associated genes could be medically useful 
and should be reported. The working group admitted that there was insufficient evidence about 
benefits, risks and costs of disclosure to make evidence-based recommendations, a consensus on the 
listed variations having been found on clinical experience largely from patients with symptoms or 
positive family histories. The conclusion was that: “Given the low prior probability that an individual 
has a monogenic disorder that could be identified incidentally through exome or genome 
sequencing, we recommended that only variants with a higher likelihood of causing disease should 
be reported as IFs although we recognise that there are limited data available in many cases to make 
this assessment”. So, the minimal list was limited to variants “where there is strong evidence of high 
probability of severe adverse medical outcomes that can be prevented or ameliorated by existing 
modalities”.19 In this sense, actionability is the leading principle driving IFs information, and it mirrors 
the bioethics principle of benefit, bienfaisance, in French.20 
French Guidelines also define actionability as availability of screening or prevention strategies, risk 
evaluation (severity, penetrance and age of disease onset), and level of evidence from published 
data. Under these criteria, genes have been divided into three classes and 60 genes were listed in 
class 1, as actionable pathogenic variants.21 There is an important overlap between the ACMG and 
SFMPP lists of actionable genes concerning cancer, except for one or two additional genes classified 
as class 1. 
 
sign. Given its long recognition as a Mendelian disorder, it is reasonable to consider Wilson disease to be at 
least relatively highly penetrant. Expressivity is variable. Treatment for Wilson disease involves administration 
copper chelating agents and/or zinc to block intestinal absorption of copper; treatment is extremely effective 
when administered prior to the onset of symptoms. Sanger sequencing of the ATP7B gene is considered 
confirmatory in asymptomatic patients. In symptomatic patients, in addition to Sanger sequencing, the results 
of serum ceruloplasmin, serum copper concentration and 14-hour urine copper excretion can be diagnostic. 
The ClinGen Actionability scoring process generated a high actionability score of 10/12 for copper chelation 
and zinc therapy in the treatment of ATP7B-associated liver disease and/or neuropsychiatric disease. Based on 
this evidence, the SFWG voted unanimously to add ATP7B to the SF list for the recessive state in which two 
KP/EP variants are detected in trans through GS. The benefit principle is also based on the recent ACGM, 
Patient re-contact after revision of genomic test results: Points to consider—A statement of the American 
College of Medical Genetics and Genomics, in Genetics in Medicine, 21, 4, 2019, 769-771. 
19 AMGC, Incidental findings in clinical genomics: A clarification in Genetics in Medicine,15, 8, 2013, 664-666, 
developing considerations of 2013 AMGC SF v1.0, cit. 
20 Three conditions should exist to have benefit: discovery must be scientifically validated; it could be 
meaningful for the patient health; and there exist a therapy or a preventive behaviour. For general references, 
see M. TOMASI, Genetica e Costituzione, cit., 33-35. 
21 In detail, for class 1 genes (n = 36), delivering the information on SFs was recommended; for class 2 genes (n 
= 5), delivering the information remained questionable because genes include significant risk and 
detection/prevention possibilities, but the literature data or level of evidence seems too low to measure the 
real benefit of an intervention in an asymptomatic context; and for class 3 genes (n = 19), delivering the 
information on SFs was unrecommended because of the moderate risk of cancer and/or prevention or limited 
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Overall, for clarity, in both U.S. and French Guidelines, disclosing secondary findings is now 
recommended, but not binding, for actionable pathogenic variants, taking advantage of the patient’s 
health. In contrast, a pathogenic variation of an incurable disease will be uncommunicated. The same 
is true for variations of uncertain or unknown significance, whose evidence should not be given to 
the practitioner (first step) or the patient (second step), because it can involve misinterpretation in 
the results, being unnecessary for the patient’s healthcare.22 
In Italy, the Data Protection Authority general authorisation no. 8 of 2016 adopted the narrow 
concept of clinical utility, defining unexpected findings in the context of genetic testing consent and 
communication as those that “represent a concrete and direct benefit in terms of therapy or 
prevention or awareness of reproductive choices”.23 But the Italian Committee of Bioethics Report, 
as a soft law source specifically focusing to incidental findings, adopted a different way. First, as we 
anticipated, the Report did not refer to an explicit list of variations, as cancer-associated genes. 
Second, the Committee adopted a smoother and descriptive approach, illustrating different 
meanings of clinical utility, the traditional stricter view, present in the U.S. Guidelines and in the 
following French ones, where there are preventive measures or treatment, and a broader sense, 
including wider considerations on situations of non-immediate interventions, or non-existing 
treatment or non-pathogenic information. This broader meaning of clinical utility implies a 
corresponding wider assessment of benefits and risks, involving the patient, family or third-person 
interests, and concerning all decisions where a choice can occur, like reproductive choices, assurance 
schemes, or other planning of life. From this perspective, all information concerning an opportunity 
of choice may be reported. The Committee observed that there is a general agreement in the 
literature on disclosure of actionable findings, while communication of uncertain results or results 
with no prevention or treatment available is discussed. In the end, the Committee suggests leaving 
to the patient, during pre-test and post-test counselling, the choice whether to have information and 
the kind of information, i.e. only pathogenic variations or even variations related to untreatable 
disease. In contrast, the Committee agrees that unknown variations or variations with uncertain 
significance should not be reported.24 By this way, an extensive discretionary is given to the patient, 
while a relatively less intense duty of qualification of clinical utility remains to the doctor.  
 
22 See also AMCG, Incidental findings in clinical genomics: A clarification, cit.: “We agree that variants of 
unknown significance, variants associated with low or unknown penetrance, and variants associated with 
disorders not currently amenable to intervention should not be reported”. For incidental findings of unknown 
significance, the SFMMP works assessed that additional follow-up tests or procedures could be risky and costly. 
23 Italian Data Protection general authorisation no. 8 of 2016, cit., par. 6, and now in the same way no. 146 of 
2019, par. 4.5. sub 3. 
24 Report Gestione degli “incidental findings”, cit., 18: “si rispetti, nella acquisizione del consenso informato, il 
diritto all’autodeterminazione del paziente e pertanto sia lasciata al consultando, una volta che ha compreso la 
differenza tra le diverse tipologie degli IF, la scelta di decidere quali risultati conoscere. Il paziente deve essere 
libero di scegliere se rifiutare le informazioni sugli IF, oppure ricevere solo informazioni relative alle patologie 
prevenibili o trattabili, o ancora conoscere anche i dati che riguardano condizioni patologiche al momento non 
prevenibili né curabili”, and note no. 39 on uncertain variations: “Non è opportuno invece comunicare le 
varianti di significato incerto, né le suscettibilità per i motivi già ricordati”. In sum, there is a difference 
between the strict clinical utility for consent and communication of the DPA general authorisation and the 
broad clinical utility of the Bioethics Committee’s Report, where the first is a mandatory source and the second 
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Clearly, statements on actionability or clinical utility, and their consequences on information, put the 
attention on clinicians’ duties and tasks. Now, it is necessary to investigate the guidelines from the 
patient’s viewpoint, and the U.S. debate has been significant again. 
 
5. (continue) the patient’s viewpoint: The uncertainty of information 
From the patient’s viewpoint, the U.S. original version of Guidelines in 2013 recommended a 
mandatory disclosure of actionable secondary findings, but this statement was revised in 2015, in a 
relatively short time. Starting from the beginning, in 2013 the working group recognised that denying 
a preference whether to receive information may be seen to violate existing ethical norms regarding 
the patient’s autonomy and the “right not to know” genetic risk information. However, they felt that 
“clinicians and laboratory personnel have a fiduciary duty to prevent harm by warning patients and 
their families about certain IFs and that this principle supersedes concerns about autonomy, just as it 
does in the reporting of IFs elsewhere in medical practice”.25 In detail, the debate on reporting IFs 
was presented as follows: While genetic libertarians believe that patients have the right to full and 
complete accounting of all possible risks conveyed by both established and novel variants, or even 
variants of unknown significance in disease genes, genetic empiricists believe that there is 
insufficient evidence about the penetrance of most pathogenic variants in the general population to 
warrant the sharing of any IFs, and that it is irresponsible to create the psychological burdens of 
being a “patient in waiting” or to expose patients to iatrogenic harm of possibly unnecessary 
surveillance or diagnostic testing.26 The fair balance comprised precisely reporting only the listed 
variations, without seeking preference from the patient and family. So, the duty to protect health 
prevails when results convey the near certainty of an adverse yet potentially preventable medical 
outcome. Not returning under these conditions was considered unethical.27 
 
DPA general authorisation no. 8 of 2016 and the ongoing no. 146 of 2019 both refer to an extensive meaning of 
utility in another stage of data processing, during the pre and post-test genetic counselling. The counsellor is 
called upon to help the person concerned to independently take the most appropriate decisions, taking into 
account genetic risk, family aspirations and ethical and religious principles, to achieve the best possible 
adaptation to the disease (see par. 4.4. of the ongoing authorisation). 
25 ACMG SF v1.0, continuing: “whenever clinical sequencing is ordered, the ordering clinician should discuss 
with the patient the possibility of incidental findings, and that laboratories seek and report findings from the 
list described in the [list] without reference to patient preferences. Patients have the right to decline clinical 
sequencing if they judge the risks of possible discovery of incidental findings to outweigh the benefits of 
testing”. 
26 ACMG SF v1.0, quoting J. M. KWON, R. D. STEINER, I’m fine; I’m just waiting for my disease: The new and 
growing class of presymptomatic patients, in Neurology, 77, 6, 2011, 522-523. 
27 AMCG, Incidental findings in clinical genomics: A clarification, cit.: “The rationale for our recommendations 
was that failure to report a laboratory test result conveying the near certainty of an adverse yet potentially 
preventable medical outcome would be unethical. A common objection to this recommendation has been that 
some genetic test results might not be predictive of disease, either because of incomplete penetrance or 
because of the occurrence of variants of unknown significance. The recommendations, however, explicitly 
focus only on unequivocally pathogenic mutations in genes in which pathogenic variants lead to disease with 
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Three points should be clarified. First, the 2013 U.S. Guidelines version clearly explained that concern 
and uncertainty surrounding IFs depend on a lack of empiric data, both on predictability and 
patients’ behaviours. Second, this position plainly rejected genetic “exceptionalism”, recalling that 
reporting IFs is a form of screening that had a long history in clinical medicine, where disease to one 
system could call for other systems’ testing in multisystem diseases.28 Third, it relied strongly on the 
clinical-patient relationship. The patient has already been presented to the medical care system and 
has been evaluated by a clinician who is familiar with the patient’s conditions and family history. The 
clinician-patient interaction is the appropriate place for extensively evaluating the opportunity of a 
specific genetic testing, and for explaining and discussing IFs eventuality.29 Patients’ opt-out option is 
not completely denied in this pattern, but is conceived at the beginning of the procedure. The 
patient, conscious of the possibility of extra findings, declines clinical sequencing if the risks of 
possible incidental discoveries outweigh the benefits of testing. 
Refusing opt-in opt-out induced a controversial debate.30 In 2015, the Guidelines were first revised, 
introducing the possibility to decline SFs through “the right not to know”. The version of 2016 
 
agree that variants of unknown significance, variants associated with low or unknown penetrance, and variants 
associated with disorders not currently amenable to intervention should not be reported”.  
28 ACMG SF v1.0, “When patients complain of symptoms in the digestive system, the well-trained physician 
examines cardiac and respiratory systems as well, both for clues to a multisystem disease and to incidentally 
discover any unrelated signs. When radiographs are read for a particular anatomical focus, the radiologist scans 
the entire radiograph and also reports on abnormal findings in regions not indicated as the primary reason for 
the study. In these situations, the patient has already presented to the medical care system, has been 
evaluated and is under the care of a clinician […]”. 
29 See also AMCG, Incidental findings in clinical genomics: A clarification, cit., where the clinician, and his or her 
consultant, i.e. clinical geneticists, is the point of reference for ordering and returning laboratory tests: “It is 
expected that the clinician will contextualize these findings to the clinical circumstances (e.g., the nature of 
ongoing clinical problems, knowledge of personal and family history, patient preferences), and the provider 
and patient will participate in a shared decision-making process regarding the return of results. This is similar to 
the shared decision-making that is undertaken by patients and physicians: whenever complex medical testing is 
contemplated, patients are informed that data generated from such tests can reveal unexpected results”. A 
strong concern is expressed on direct-to-consumer testing, where patients directly receive results from 
laboratories, but “Patients who seek out their laboratory test results independent of their healthcare providers 
have made their own choice about learning these results”. 
30 See A. TOWNSEND, F. ROUSSEAU, J. FRIEDMAN, S. ADAM, Z. LOHN, P. BIRCH, Autonomy and the patient’s ‘not to know’ 
in clinical whole-genomic sequencing, in European Journal of Human Genetics, 22, 2014, 6-11, questioning 
constructively the obligation to return IFs because of paternalism, predicating upon “the physician as 
gatekeeper” model, instead of the “patient as partner” or “patient as gatekeeper” models. They broadly rely on 
autonomy in Andorno sense, following in this paper, arguing that a chance must be offered in all pre-test and 
post-test counselling and the choice cannot be presumed, but must be activated by the patient. The position is 
based on a focus group study, whose participants strongly supported the right to decline information: 
“Individuals may have valid reasons for not knowing results. The “objective” clinical utility of knowledge may 
have very different meaning “subjectively” for patient regarding its relevance and manageability for them; all 
things considered, they simply may make an informed choice not to have the information disclosed to them. 
The impact that all genetic information has on the individual, including psychological, social and financial 
consequences or harms, needs to be reconsidered by clinicians at all stages of disclosure”. In contrast, for 
further critics to “the right not to know” as an autonomy based right, because the right to refuse medical 
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confirms this solution and is stated as follows: An additional modification to the original policy 
included offering an option to opt out of receiving SFs for individuals undergoing clinical genomic 
sequencing (GS). This revision was due, in part, to results from a survey of ACMG members in which 
more than 80% of respondents supported an option for patients undergoing GS to decline SF analysis 
following appropriate counselling. In conclusion, for U.S. Guidelines now informed consent is 
necessary and reporting of secondary findings is optional. 
Similarly, the issue has been deeply discussed during the French SFMPP works as well, and many 
doubts have arisen. The French working groups considered that genomic consent rules did not 
adequately fit with the disclosure of secondary findings from genome sequencing, nether under Art. 
L. 1111-4 Code de la santé, inspired by Art. 5 Oviedo Convention, nor as the informed consent under 
the Loi Bioètique. Art. 5 Oviedo Convention, in particular, may not be suitable with SFs because there 
is no “intervention”, neither “act”, nor “treatment”. Moreover, there is no well-established, but only 
possible information. Again, predictability is one of the main problems. The disease is uncertain, but 
possible. It depends not only on the genome, but also on lifestyle, environment or other external 
factors. The quantity and quality of information have also been questioned because the lack of 
knowledge could depend on the scarcity of data, but even their large amount can be a problem, 
making their interpretation unclear and doubtful. Therefore, informed consent, as provided in 
general for genomic testing, may be unsuitable per se for the communication of secondary findings. 
The working groups questioned, in the end, the practical possibility of a right to know or not to know, 
because the object of knowledge is too uncertain and undefinable. 
Ethically, four alternatives were discussed concerning the degree of disclosure, assuming autonomy 
in the meaning of making a life lived according to each own project: first, to be always informed (être 
prévenu systématiquement), expression of the principle of absolute autonomy, i.e. the right to know 
everything (droit de tout connaître); second, to be informed of relevant information (être prévenu 
avec les informations pertinentes), mirroring the principle of controlled autonomy depending on the 
relevance of data; third, not to be informed, unless the relevant information is strongly validated or 
clinical assistance is very recommended, mirroring again the principle of controlled autonomy, but 
focusing on a significant loss of chance; fourth, not to be informed at all. During the works, it has 
been specified that all alternatives imply a certain degree of paternalism, either in the obligation to 
know, as the only way to make choices and worthily organise life, or in completely avoiding 
knowledge, assuming that the patient could not understand the choice or to bear the pain. Finally, 
spoiling the end of the story, French Guidelines opt for a model of partial disclosure, admitting “the 
right not to know” of the patient as a central feature and adopting a new formula called “double 
consent”, which dissociates the announcement of primary findings from SFs, as we will illustrate 
later.31 
 
significant information, B.B. BERKMAN, S.C. HULL, L.G. BIESECKER, Scrutinizing the Right Not to Know, in The 
American Journal of Bioethics, 15, 7, 2015, 17-19. 
31 See the presentation Consentement éclairé et aspects éthiques of Ms. Michèle Anahory, lawyer, during the 
works of SFMMP working groups, available at https://www.sfmpp.org/2019/01/31/recommandations-de-la-
sfmpp-sur-les-donnees-secondaires/ until November 2019. In January 2021, videos and power points were 
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The Italian Bioethics Committee also referred to “the right not to know”, and the report on IFs deeply 
discussed its rationale relying on the results of a Canadian Symposium held in Spring 2014.32 The 
Committee identified three main meanings of autonomy as the source of the right to decline 
information: first, the protection from interferences of others in the most personal choices, 
requesting policies that enforce individual liberties, including “the right not to know” health data; 
second, autonomy as control by a rational agent of all circumstances of life, to make responsible and 
organised choices, and here there is no room for “the right not to know”, lack of information 
preventing any rational decision,33 third, “veridicity” in Hans Jonas words in the seventies, facing 
biomedical innovations, i.e. the right to find his own way of life and to shape the future. This last 
position supports a moral right to ignorance about the future, for example, for genetic diseases 
where no treatment is available, to remain free in determining the sense of self. However, these 
different theoretical models, in the Committee’s opinion, did not help find a concrete solution if the 
patient had not expressed any will about being informed or not. Hence, the Committee referred to 
another theoretical scheme, Laurie’s approach to privacy, which we will deeply analyse in the next 
paragraph. Finally, the Italian Committee, as we mentioned before, recognised centrality to self-
determination, assigning priority to pre-test and post-test counselling with support of psychological 
expertise, and stating the existence of the right to choose whether to be informed and on which 
pathogenic results, actionable and non-actionable.34 
Collectively, the U.S. Guidelines recommend the reporting as secondary findings of known or 
expected pathogenic variants and do not recommend reporting variants of uncertain significance or 
associated with disorders not currently amenable to intervention. The focus is mainly on SFs related 
to monogenic disorders for which there is a higher likelihood of causing the disease, i.e. evidence of 
clinical utility. Since 2015, informed consent is necessary, and reporting SFs is optional. 
Similarly, French Guidelines of 2018 suggest reporting only pathogenic variations and clearly assure 
an opt-in opt-out option to patient, adopting the procedural approach of “double consent”. In this 
way, for the French too, the knowledge of secondary findings is limited to variations where validated 
screening or prevention strategies are available, is optional, even if recommended, and it depends on 
the will of patient to know or not to know. 
The Italian Bioethics Committee suggested that laboratories should store secondary findings, 
including non-known variations; centrality should be given to self-determination of the patient 
 
32 From the Right to Know to the Right not to Know, Special Issue in Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 42, 1, 
2014, Special Issue, 1-6. 
33 Report Gestione degli “incidental findings”, cit., 16, referring to J. HARRIS, K. KEYWOOD, Ignorance, Information 
and Autonomy, in Theoretical Medicine, 22, 5, 2001, 415-436. 
34 Report Gestione degli “incidental findings”, cit., 18. There is a sort of contradiction in the Report. In the 
previous part, concerning the different rationales of autonomy, the Committee observed that the interest 
and/or right not to know should be protected to the greatest extension. Later, it is said that being not absolute, 
the right can be limited, depending on factual circumstances, to protect other interests, that the Committee do 
not explicitly mention, in a case-by-case evaluation. In that context, said the Committee, it is not possible to 
completely avoid discretionary because it is in the last resort to clinicians, or researchers, with the help of 
consultants, decide to ‘exceptions’, relying on the kind of information at stake. Overall, while great relevance is 
given to the patient’s choice by letting him to decide the kind of pathogenic variations to be known, the final 
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through consent, leaving him the choice to select which variations to know, pathogenic with clear 
clinical utility or pathogenic without available treatment. The difference from U.S. and French 
conclusions is consistent, involving non-actionable pathogenic variations.35 In contrast, all 
recommendations refuse reporting and communication of unknown variations. 
6. The right not to know: Legal basis and conceptual objections 
The overruling of U.S. Guidelines from a mandatory disclosure of secondary findings concerning 
pathogenic variations to an optional choice, from 2013 to 2015, is a clear symptom of the very 
sensitivity of the issue and the complexity of the interests involved. The same impression comes from 
the French debate on the suitability of traditional informed consent because of the uncertainty of 
information itself. For the patient, now all guidelines clearly refer to the so-called right not to know. 
Despite the incertitude and the intense debate, “the right not to know” in health matters has a clear 
legal basis in international law. It dates to 1997 in both the UNESCO Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights, Art. 5.c, and in the Oviedo Convention on Human Right and Biomedicine, 
Art. 10.2.36 The Oviedo Additional Protocol concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purpose, entered 
into force recently, on 1 July 2018, protects the wish of a person undergoing a genetic test not to be 
informed.37 Under both the Oviedo Convention and its Protocol, the right to know or not to know is 
part of the right to respect private life. Also, a right to decline information is provided by many 
domestic legislations, and recently by Italian law on consent and non-resuscitation orders too, no. 
219 of 2017.38 Prior to this law, as we mentioned, rules were provided for under the Italian Data 
Protection Authority authorisation, with the specific task of regulating the processing of genetic data. 
 
35 Gestione degli “incidental findings” nelle indagini genomiche con le nuove piattaforme tecnologiche, cit., 18. 
36 “2. Everyone is entitled to know any information collected about his or her health. However, the wishes of 
individuals not to be so informed shall be observed. 3. In exceptional cases, restrictions may be placed by law 
on the exercise of the rights contained in paragraph 2 in the interests of the patient”. The right not to know is 
recognised also in international clinical guideline, the World Medical Association Declaration on the Rights of 
the Patient of 1981, revised in 1995, Art. 7.d: “the patient has the right not to be informed on his/her explicit 
request, unless required for the protection of another person’s life”, and the World Health Organisation 
Guidelines on Ethical Issues in Medical Genetics and the Provision of Genetic Services of 1997, Table 7: “the wish 
of individual and families not to know genetic information, including test results, should be respected, except in 
testing of new born babies or children for treatable conditions”. 
37 “2. Everyone undergoing a genetic test is entitled to know any information collected about his or her health 
derived from this test. The conclusions drawn from the test shall be accessible to the person concerned in a 
comprehensible form. 3. The wish of a person not to be informed shall be respected. 4. In exceptional cases, 
restrictions may be placed by law on the exercise of the rights contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 above in the 
interests of the person concerned”. 
38 Art. 3 It. law no. 219 of 2017: “Ogni persona ha il diritto di conoscere le proprie condizioni di salute e di 
essere informata in modo completo, aggiornato e a lei comprensibile riguardo alla diagnosi, alla prognosi, ai 
benefici e ai rischi degli accertamenti diagnostici e dei trattamenti sanitari indicati, nonché riguardo alle 
possibili alternative e alle conseguenze dell’eventuale rifiuto del trattamento sanitario e dell’accertamento 
diagnostico o della rinuncia ai medesimi. Può rifiutare in tutto o in parte di ricevere le informazioni ovvero 
indicare i familiari o una persona di sua fiducia incaricati di riceverle e di esprimere il consenso in sua vece se il 
paziente lo vuole. Il rifiuto o la rinuncia alle informazioni e l’eventuale indicazione di un incaricato sono 
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For what is relevant here, this authorisation referred to secondary discoveries, stipulating that the 
information resulting from a genetic testing to be provided to the data subject included among the 
results the “unexpected news” and stating that the data subject was required to declare whether or 
not he wanted to know the results, including the unexpected one.39 Differently, Italian law no. 219 of 
2017 does not explicitly concern genetic testing but gives a general framework on consent and the 
substantive values it embodies. Perhaps terms like “informed consent”, “diagnostic assessment”, or 
“treatment”, under this law, could not be suitable for genetic information, thereby raising the same 
concerns of the French debate resumed before. But we assume that the general framework provided 
by this law, giving centrality to the trusty clinical-patient relation, to dignity and self-determination of 
the patient and decisional autonomy and expertise of the practitioner, is broad enough to apply to 
genetic testing too. Moreover, we consider that IFs returning policies move rapidly, depending on 
increasing evidence-based data both on predictability of information and on psychological impact, so 
that, at this time, a more specific legislation may not be appropriate, while an adjustment based on 
clinical guidelines regularly updated, and hopefully standardised across Europe, seems desirable. 
Despite these legal references, as we have seen, the clinical, ethical, and legal debate on IFs 
concentrated on the acceptability of a “not to know” pretension. Whole-genome sequencing has 
dramatically broadened the scope of available information.40 Nevertheless, the general lines of the 
debate about the rationale of the right not to know have not significantly changed. Therefore, it 
seems useful to illustrate them. 
The relation between the right to know or not to know and genetic information has been explored 
since the 2000s.41 Literature specified that “the right not to know” one’s genetic status raised several 
objections. Preliminarily, this right goes strongly against the trend of claiming, affirming and 
widening the right to know health information by patients, which has been fundamental to re-define 
the modern doctor-patient relationship. More generally, politically and philosophically, the right to 
remain in ignorance seems contrary to the desire to know, as a feature that distinguishes humans 
from other animals, and to the capability of knowledge as a prerequisite for decision, that is, at the 
foundation of legal rights since the Enlightenment. 
Further, if we leave aside, for a moment, the issue of health information, from a constitutional 
perspective the right to know has been questioned by American law scholars since the 1960s as a 
 
39 See the DPA general authorisation no. 8 of 2016, cit., par. 5, lett. b) on unexpected results; par. 6, second 
sentence, on informed consent: “the person concerned is required to state whether or not he or she wishes to 
know the results of the examination or research, including any unexpected information concerning him or her, 
if it represents a concrete and direct benefit for the person concerned in terms of treatment or prevention or 
awareness of reproductive choices”. The regulation is remained the same under the ongoing DPA authorisation 
no. 146 of 2019, par. 4.3 on Information, including unexpected news among the attainable results, par. 4.5, sub 
3, on Consent, par. 4.6. on Communication and dissemination of data, under which: “the results of genetic 
testing must be communicated to the person concerned also in accordance with his or her declaration of 
willingness to know or not to know such events and, where necessary, together with appropriate genetic 
counselling” (our translation from Italian). 
40 B.M. KNOPPERS, From the Right to Know to the Right Not to Know, in Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 
special issue 42, 1, 2014, 1-10, 6, who argues that the question now is not whether to return results, but how 
much information should be returned. 
41 For general references, R. CHADWICK, M. LEVITT, D. SHICKLE (eds.), The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know. 
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basic principle for democracy, referring it to the freedom of press and the public to acquire and share 
information on government and the exercise of public powers. Certainly, the context highly differs, 
but it is to say how knowledge is perceived as a stronghold, perhaps the most important, for 
democracy in Western societies.42 Notably, even in that context, the right to know, as part of the 
liberty of expression, also covered a personal intimate position, essential to personal fulfilment. It is a 
significant method for seeking the truth, or at least for seeking the better answer, as it has been 
said.43 In addition, in that context “the right not to know” emerged as the other side of the right to 
know, particularly in the meaning of not to be forced to receive communication. However, 
concurrently, it was relevant in narrower cases, much less significant for democracy than the right to 
know ones.44 
Overall, knowledge seems to be the essence of human life. This is perfectly described in the famous 
words that the Italian poet Dante gave to Ulisse: “Fatti non foste a viver come bruti ma per seguir 
virtute e canoscenza”45 [Consider your origin: you were not born to live like brutes, but to follow 
virtues and knowledge]. However, going back to health information, there are other objections to 
“the right not to know”. It would undermine the relationship between doctor and patient, hindering 
the duty to disclose health information to the patient and returning to the paternalistic approach by 
which doctors are restricted to tell the truth, to supposedly protect the patient from harm. 
Moreover, “the right not to know” would be in contrast to the values of solidarity and responsibility, 
preventing the possibility of giving vital information to family members, in opposition to the 
relational nature of genetic information with relatives.46 
 
42 See for example in the U.S. debate, T. I. EMERSON, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, in Washington 
University Law Quarterly, 1, 1976, 1-24, lecture delivered on March 3, 1976, during the Symposium The First 
Amendment and the Right to Know, discussing a constitutional theory and workable operating rules to anchor 
the right to know, an emerging constitutional right, in the U.S. Constitution. The A. opens the paper quoting a 
letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, August 4, 1822, in 9 Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hurst ed. 
1910): “A popular government, without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a 
farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And people who mean to be 
their own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives”. 
43 T.I. EMERSON, op. cit., 2, 4: “Moreover, the right to know serves the same function in our society as the right 
to communicate. It is essential to personal self-fulfilment. It is a significant method for seeking the truth, or at 
least for seeking the better answer. It is necessary for collective decision-making in a democratic society. And it 
is vital as a mechanism for effectuating social change without resort to violence or undue coercion”. Personal 
fulfilment is considered an important aspect because “our society moves further and further towards 
conformity and depersonalization”. 
44 See T.I. EMERSON, op. cit., 22-23, for whom the right not to know is a limit of the right to know, but much less 
meaningful than another opposite right, the right to privacy. While privacy needs the application of complex 
balancing theories, the right not to know, in U.S. Supreme Court case law at that time, refers to “simple” cases 
on the refusal to listen to music and broadcasting during bus travels, or to receive mails from anonymous 
senders. In general, concluded the A., the conflict is between the right not to know and the right to 
communicate, rather than the right to know. 
45 Dante Inferno, Canto ventiseiesimo, vv. 112-120. 
46 There would be also a practical impossibility of the right not to know, and a logical contradiction, because “in 
the very process of asking “Do you want to know whether you are at risk…?”, the geneticist has already made 
the essence of the information known”, in D.C. WERTZ, J.C. FLETCHER, Privacy and Disclosure in Medical Genetics 
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7. Theoretical frameworks between autonomy and privacy 
Despite the referred objections, as we have seen, the right to refuse health information has a specific 
legal basis in international law, and in domestic law too, including now in Italian law. Different 
rationales of the right have been proposed to describe its nature and substance. We limit our 
analysis to two theoretical frameworks, which have had a great echo in the debate: “the right not to 
know” as an expression of autonomy and as an expression of privacy. The first thesis has been 
argued by Roberto Andorno. Against the argument that ignorance affects autonomy, preventing any 
choice and control,47 Andorno argues that “the right not to know” is part of autonomy itself, 
understood as self-determination, mirroring the basic bioethical principle for which everyone should 
be free to make choices regarding health information. It is part of autonomy, without any 
paternalism, because the decision is in the patient’s hands and does not come from abroad.48 
Autonomy is presented as the immediate source of the right, but the substantive interest protected 
in the end is psychological integrity, through the possibility to avoid the harmful effects of genetic 
information.49 In Andorno’s description, this right relies on an active approach from two 
perspectives. First, the opportunity of a choice is given to the patient. Second, the expression of will 
from the patient, being an explicit choice, is required50. Unlike, the privacy framework excludes the 
disclosure of information even if the patient has not explicitly expressed his or her will. This seems to 
be the main difference between the two frameworks, as we will see now. 
The second framework, supported by Graeme Laurie, argues that “the right not to know” is not a 
right in itself, but an interference to privacy. While the framing paradigm of autonomy is choice, the 
framing paradigm of privacy is non-interference. More deeply, for Laurie, the ethical and legal basis 
of “the right not to know” is rooted in a “psychological spatial privacy, to the aim of safeguarding 
“one’s own sense of the self”.51 The point is that spatial privacy should protect the patient even if no 
explicit choice has been made to assure that unsolicited revelations are prevented. 
 
invalid, because prior explanation of the possibility to find something does not say anything about the final 
output; so the effectiveness of the right relies, as always happens, on when and how information is given. 
47 For example, J. HARRIS, K. KEYWOOD, Ignorance, Information and Autonomy, cit, 415-436. 
48 R. ANDORNO, The right not to know: An autonomy based approach, in Journal of Medical Ethics, 30, 2004, 435-
440, spec. 436, who refers this meaning of autonomy also to German legal literature, as part of the “right to 
informational self-determination” [“Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung”]. 
49 R. ANDORNO, cit., 436, recalling the oldest principle of medical clinics “first, do not harm” – “Primus non 
nocere,” and the modern “principle of non-maleficence,” including patient’s psychological integrity. 
50 R. ANDORNO, cit., relies also on normative indications: The European Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, Art. 10.2, the UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, Art. 5.c, 
as well as the WMA Declaration on the Right of the Patient, Art. 7.d, and the WHO Guidelines on Ethical Issues 
in Medical Genetics and the Provision of Genetic Services, Table 7, all require an explicit choice to the 
functioning of the right not to know. 
51 See G. LAURIE, In defence of ignorance; genetic information and the right not to know, in European Journal of 
Health Law, 6, 1999, 119-132; ID, Protecting and promoting privacy in an uncertain world: Further defences of 
ignorance and the right not to know, ivi, 7, 2000, 185-191; ID, Challenging medical-legal norms. The role of 
autonomy, confidentiality, and privacy in protecting individual and familial group rights in genetic information, 
in Journal of Legal Medicine, 22, 2001, 1-54; ID, Genetic privacy. A Challenge to medico-legal norms, Cambridge, 
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Collectively, the autonomy and privacy framework both protect the same substantive position, 
psychological integrity, and both admit that autonomy and privacy often overlap. Also, as Andorno 
himself noted, unsolicited information directly interferes with psychological integrity, passing by the 
choice on knowledge. However, the two theoretical frameworks differ in differentiating between 
general rule and exceptions. Under the privacy approach, non-interference is the rule, so that 
information becomes the exception. However, this effect, in Andorno’s opinion, subverts the 
clinician’s duty of disclosure principle. In fact, under the autonomy framework, the rule remains that 
the patient has the right to know his or her health status and that an alternative should be offered to 
him or her, if to have information or to remain in ignorance.52 Non-information as a rule breaks this 
pattern. Overall, for the autonomy approach, “the right not to know” cannot be presumed but 
should be “activated” by the explicit will of the person. 
Alternatively, it is true that the language of privacy has resonance with the ways that Western legal 
systems frame the interests involved.53 Laurie recalls the “penumbra” definition of privacy in the U.S. 
Supreme Court case law on abortion and reproductive choices,54 and, in Europe, the Strasbourg 
Court case law on Art. 8, par. 1, ECHR concerning respect for private and family life . But, the 
theoretical framework of Laurie’s spatial privacy differs in reality from the ECHR interpretation. It is 
not the case here to deeply analyse the case law on 8 ECHR. It is enough to say that respect for 
private life under Art. 8 ECHR covers, depending on the circumstances of the case, personal 
autonomy, physical and psychological integrity, individual’s psychological wellbeing and dignity.55 
 
a plea for conceptual clarity, in R. CHADWICK, M. LEVITT, D. SHICKLE (eds.), The Right to Know and the Right Not to 
Know. Genetic Privacy and Responsibility, cit., 38-51. 
52 R. ANDORNO, op. cit., stresses that to determine which right should prevail will depend on the circumstances 
of each case, but law and ethics need rules to operate coherently. The right to know too, since its origin, had a 
positive shape. See T. I. EMERSON, cit., 2, for whom the right to know focuses on the affirmative aspects of the 
first amendment and the system of freedom of expression, the negative right to be free of government 
interferences being partial, meaning that the right is entitled to support by legislation or other affirmative 
government action. 
53 G. LAURIE, Recognizing the Right Not to Know: Conceptual, Professional, and Legal Implications, in Journal of 
Law, Medicine and Ethics, special issue 42, 1, 2014, 53-63, spec. 57. 
54 It is well known that privacy has different meanings, depending on each normative background and legal 
tradition. In a very general manner, at the origin U.S. privacy referred to a spatial dimension: it was intended to 
protect a zone of privacy within which the individual is protected against any intrusion from any rule or 
practise, public or private. Actually, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the constitutional foundation of consent 
under the due process clause of XIV Amendment on the grounds of a common law rule rooted in history and 
traditions, which considers forced medication as a battery. See R.R. FADEN, T.L. BEAUCHAMP, A History and Theory 
of Informed Consent, New York, Oxford, 1986, 120 ff., and, in Italian literature, C. CASONATO, Introduzione al 
biodiritto, Torino, 3rd ed., 2012, 160 ff. To question the right not to know, B.B. BERKMAN, S.C. HULL, L.G. BIESECKER, 
Scrutinizing the Right Not to Know, cit., 17, argue that the Cruzan v. Director case, 1990, concerning hydration 
and nutrition, related to bodily integrity, and cannot be extended to psychological integrity, falling outside the 
scope the XIV Amendment. 
55 See for all P. VAN DIJK, F. VAN HOOF, A. VAN RIJN, L. ZWAAK, Theory and Practise of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 5th ed., Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, 2018, 667-734. A recent summary of the case law is 
available in the Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, dated 31.8.2020, at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf. The case law is divided in three categories: (i) a 
person’s physical, psychological, or moral integrity, (ii) his privacy and (iii) his identity and autonomy. Under the 
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Now, the Laurie’s notion of space and preemptive non-interference fits with the original meaning of 
privacy, as undue home invasion from unlawful house searches or other police activities. It entails a 
negative obligation of abstention by public powers. However, the evolution of ECHR privacy, even 
concerning personal and intimate aspects of personality, has given increasingly importance to the so-
called positive obligations.56 Applicants claim a violation of eight ECHRs because of omissions by 
national authorities. Their quest is for an intervention of State at different levels, legislative, 
administrative or in practise, to put in place conditions to effectively develop their intimate 
expectations. It is also true that the opposition between negative and positive obligations is a false 
one, because negative obligations can easily be restated as positive obligations, and vice versa, and 
all rights can just as readily be described as having correlative obligations that are both positive and 
negative.57 Anyway, the concept of positive obligation emphasises that standing is not enough for 
public authorities to respect rights. 
Thus, in our opinion, Laurie’s approach seems less convincing for two reasons. First, it recalls the 
ancient model of privacy as a duty of abstention from undue invasions but overshadows the positive 
duty of intervention implied in “the right not to know”. For the good intention to avoid unsolicited 
information, it overlooks the complexity of positive and negative behaviours which are required by 
this right. Second, the “spatial privacy approach” seems to place the patient in a previous condition 
of isolation, supposing a pre-emptive opposition to intervention and, in some way, leaving him alone. 
Intervention as an assumed intrusion recalls an authoritarian, vertical model, while the doctor-
patient relationship developed through years tends to a horizontal model, inspired by mutual trust. 
Further, if an unsolicited information is given, or a problem arises about sharing information or not, 
 
§117), personality development (Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], §95), physical and psychological 
integrity (Söderman v. Sweden, [GC], §80), relations with other human beings (Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi 
Associés v. France [GC], §83), the protection of personal data (M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, §87) and a person’s 
image (Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, §38). The ECHR ruled for the first time that the notion of private life 
covered the physical and moral integrity of the person in X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, §22, 
concerning the sexual assault of a mentally disabled sixteen-year old girl and the absence of criminal law 
provisions to provide her with effective and practical protection. Since this first case, the Court has held that 
the authorities’ positive obligations—in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 ECHR, and in other instances under 
Article 8 taken alone or in combination with Article 3—may include a duty to maintain and apply in practice an 
adequate legal framework affording protection. 
56 See for all A.R. MOWBRAY, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights, London, 2004; M. KLATT, Positive Obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, in Zeitschrift für ausländisches öfentliches Recht und Völkerrecht = 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law, 71, 4, 2011, 691-718, discussing positive and negative obligations and 
the principle of proportionality under Alexy theories. The main reasons why the negative wording of ECHR has 
been rephrased in positive terms are the overcome of the distinction between first generation, civil and 
political rights, and second generation, social rights, a pure passive approach to human rights being insufficient 
due to the complexity of our society, and indivisibility emerging under day-by-day situations; the need for 
effectiveness, especially after the reform of 1998 on individual applications; the main critics to this evolution 
rely on the lack of democratic accountability of the ECtHR, in. B. DICKINSON, Positive Obligations and the 
European Court of Human Rights, in Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, Special Issue, 61, 3, 2010, 203-208, 
collecting the acts of a workshop on positive obligations in ECHR case law held in the Human Rights Centre of 
the School of Law at Queen’s University Belfast, 24 March 2010. 
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probably a movement which breaks individual “separateness” has already happened and maybe it 
has been caused by the patient himself, because he or she has already made access to healthcare. 
Therefore, the question is how public authorities should manage the situation to let the patient, 
whose separateness has already been infringed, enjoy his or her right to refuse information. Overall, 
the spatial privacy approach, as mere abstention, contrary to the ECtHR case law, underestimates all 
conditions, tasks and duties required to make a right effective, which is at the core of Art. 8 ECHR 
interpretation. 
Another debate on “the right not to know” concerns the effectiveness of freedom and the possibility 
of coercion. Briefly, criticism of the autonomy approach could be formulated considering that people 
are not always free to decide according to their real interests, because various forms of coercion, in a 
more or less explicit way, may interfere and press their will. We will see now that the effectiveness of 
freedom occupies the debate on negative or positive liberties. 
8. Constitutional background between negative and positive liberty 
It is well known that BioLaw shows a strong trans-nationality due to the cross-communication of 
scientists and the growing importance of international instruments, legally binding and non-binding. 
Scientific research is naturally cross-border, and its permeability implies a dilution of the distance 
between different constitutional cultures and a weakening of borders between common law and civil 
law systems. However, concurrently, there are certain “constitutional features” that depend on 
history, tradition, doctrine and practise. An attempt is made to analyse whether different approaches 
to set the right to know or not to know secondary findings could be justified by different 
constitutional cultures. The second part of this paper addresses this issue. 
The relatively fast shifting of U.S. Guidelines on secondary findings from mandatory to optional 
disclosure, from 2013 to 2015, and the recognition of the right not to know, seem to put greater 
emphasis on autonomy of the patient as the only relevant principle at stake. As a first impression, 
this interpretation could rely on the primacy of personal liberty in the U.S. constitutional tradition, 
mistrusting government and public authorities’ intervention affecting individual choices. This pattern 
comes after the origins of American society, where the smallholders refused positive interventions 
from authorities, finding a consensus on the core values of individual capacity, property and 
limitation of powers.58 However, the strong emphasis which the first version of U.S. 
Recommendations put on the fiduciary duty of care and the clinician’s obligation to prevent harm, to 
justify a mandatory disclosure, shows that this first impression is false. 
Also, scholars’ in-depth analysis has demonstrated that American constitutional tradition cannot be 
reduced to liberty as an isolated right from different perspectives.59 First, American tradition is 
 
58 On the role of property as a model to describe personal rights, see later in the text. 
59 A. DI MARTINO, La doppia dimensione dei diritti fondamentali, in V. BALDINI (ed.), Cos’è un diritto fondamentale, 
Atti del Convegno Annuale di Cassino, 10–11 giugno 2016, Napoli, 2017, 123-158, spec. 136-142, and 
extensively in Gruppodipisa.it, no. 2 of 2016, who compares German, American and Italian constitutional 
backgrounds on rights and duties, using as a starting point the relation between individual dimension and 
institutional dimension, i.e. the institutional and organisational measures giving substance to rights, where the 






































100 Alessia-Ottavia Cozzi 
BioLaw Journal – Rivista di BioDiritto, Special Issue 1/2021 
pervaded by republicanism, which refers to common good, political participation and protection of 
liberties through the rule of law. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court case law, while discovering 
fundamental rights through the due process clause of the XIV Amendment, often refers to liberty and 
justice or, in more recent cases, ruled on freedoms that require a positive intervention of the State, 
for example, on the same-sex couple marriage.60 Then, to give place to autonomy and personal 
development, public authorities must engage and adopt organisational measures. The same 
“positive” background is involved in the debate on privacy, if understood not only as a duty of 
abstention, but also as a duty of protection, to create and assure a place for freedom of choice 
despite different social and economic conditions. Third, different American constitutional theories 
associate rights and autonomy to responsibility, considering the promotional role played by the 
State.61 Finally, concerning social rights, it has been demonstrated that they cannot be differentiated 
from civil rights regarding the costs and engagement of public authorities because even civil rights 
protection needs public expence and organisational measures. 
This agrees with the American debate on the negative or positive meaning of liberty. The debate 
became stronger between social and political philosophers after the famous distinction defended by 
Isaiah Berlin in 1950s.62 It has been demonstrated that many aspects of negative and positive liberty 
overlap, so that the distinction is not theoretically clear, but remains useful in a descriptive sense, at 
least to map different theories of liberty. Negative liberty, here, means the absence of obstacles or 
constraints, and usually refers to the absence of voluntary, intentional actions of others. Positive 
liberty is the possibility of acting, having control of one’s life and realisation of one’s purposes. Thus, 
positive liberty can be understood as self-realisation or self-determination. The concept gives 
relevance not only to external voluntary interventions of others, but also to internal barriers which 
could influence one’s behaviour, for example ignorance, or fear, admitting interventions of the State 
to make the individual effectively free, interventions not normally allowed by a liberal conception.63 
As we said, the distinction has a descriptive meaning more than a prescriptive one. Libertarian and 
egalitarian in many cases overlap, giving different meanings to the constraint of freedom, where 
libertarians count as a restriction of freedom those brought about intentionally, being subject to the 
arbitrary will of another, and egalitarians endorse a broader conception of constraints as unintended 
obstacles, including economic forces, social conditions, poverty, instruction or other factors which 
 
Positive and Negative Liberty, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in plato.stanford.edu, first published on 
February 27, 2003; last revision August 2, 2016, 5. 
60 A. DI MARTINO, quoted above. 
61 Compare the literature concerning a duty of protection of State, in A. DI MARTINO, cit., 28, who observes that 
a general category as the Schutzpflichten lacks in American tradition, but many Authors found a duty of 
protection principle rooted in the common law and translated into States’ Constitutions. 
62 I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in I. BERLIN, Four Essays on Liberty, London, 1969, new edition in 2002. 
63 For a full discussion of Berlin’s theory and scholars’ different positions, I. CARTER, Positive and Negative 
Liberty, cit., devoting an extensive analysis to G. McCallum’s “one concept of liberty” theory, in 1967, following 
F. Oppenheim studies in the 1950s., for whom the dichotomy between “freedom from” and “freedom to” is a 
false one and always refer to a triadic relation between three things, an agent, certain preventing conditions, 
and certain doings or becoming from agent, so that each theorist could be considered a supporter of the 
negative or positive one depending on the viewpoint. In sum “it is conceptually and historically misleading to 
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are external, but also the presence of abilities, of capabilities, both influencing the internal sense of 
self and self-realisation.64 These nuances lead us to a similar coexistence between negative and 
positive sides of liberty in the Italian constitutional framework. 
 
9. Consent and the right of self-determination in the Italian constitutional framework 
In the French legal system, free and informed consent is considered an expression of human 
dignity.65 In Italian system, consent is usually described as a component of the right to self-
determination.66 This right is not explicitly mentioned under the Italian Constitution. Nevertheless, 
since the 1990s, the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) held that self-determination is a constitutional 
right. It could be useful to describe briefly how this right has been woven into Italian basic norms. 
The story of self-determination is like the current of a river, born as part of its natural flow, and then 
perceived as a single stream. Its origin is peculiar both because of the sources and the meaning. 
Starting from the sources, self-determination has always been strictly related to consent. Initially, 
consent was required by deontological sources, literature and justice, but not by law. In this way, 
rules for practise and a case-by-case approach lay the foundations of consent. As we have seen, only 
in 2017 has a general law on consent entered into force, turning the case-law principles into a 
legislative written text. 
Regarding the meaning, self-determination was discovered by the ItCC as part of the right to health 
protected by Art. 32 It. Const. The Italian constitutional right to health is a very complex figure. It 
could be described, as the Italian constitutional scholars say, like a figure with different dimensions.67 
It comprehends liberties and duties, individual rights and general interests. Briefly, the constitutional 
right to health means freedom to choose if and how to seek treatments and, at the opposite, 
freedom not to seek treatment and to refuse them. Concurrently, health entails a typical social right, 
the right to access healthcare and to benefit from medical treatment. In other systems, the right to 
health could be framed differently. For example, it has been observed that the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights properly guarantees the freedom side and the social side under different 
articles.68 Nevertheless, despite the different formulation, these two dimensions, the freedom to 
 
64 On types and sources of constraints in liberal and egalitarian theories and their nuances, and on the 
ambiguity of term “external” as the source of obstacles, I. CARTER, cit., 8, 9. 
65 Fr. Conseil Constitutionnel, 24 July 1994: “le devoir d’information est un principe à valeur constitutionnelle et 
trouve son fondement dans l’exigence du respect du principe constitutionnel de la sauvegarde de la dignité de la 
personne humaine”. 
66 For a complete bibliography on informed consent, M. TOMASI, Genetica e Costituzione, cit., 38-39, note 82. 
67 Constitutional rights are described within dimensions in P. RIDOLA, Diritti fondamentali. Un’introduzione, 
Torino, 2006. 
68 A. CARMINATI, Libertà di cura e autonomia del medico. Profili costituzionali, Bari, 2018, 55-56, referring to Art. 
3.2, Right to the integrity of the person, Title I, Dignity, for the right to consent: “1. Everyone has the right to 
respect for his or her physical and mental integrity. 2. In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must 
be respected in particular: (a) the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the 
procedures laid down by law […]”, in which consent is part of the integrity of the body; Art. 35, Healthcare: 
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choose treatments and the right to obtain them, are inevitably interconnected. The freedom 
dimension may be void if medical treatments are inaccessible, for example, because they are 
expensive. Liberty could be formally affirmed, but it is denied if choices are unaffordable.69 Then, in 
the Italian constitutional framework, social rights to healthcare and healthcare organisations in 
general are strictly connected to the freedom dimension. A clear symptom of this interconnection 
lies in the wording of Art. 32 It. Const., which guarantees free medical care to the indigent. Also, 
under Art. 32 It. Const. health is a general interest and entails the obligation to behave under the law 
to achieve collective health. A typical example of health as a collective interest are mandatory 
vaccinations.70 
Under this framework, ItCC found the basis for the right to self-determination. It has been discovered 
as a current in the health river, and it has become a single stream. Precisely, the right to self-
determination has been derived from the second paragraph of Art. 32 It. Const. “No one may be 
obliged to undergo any health treatment except under the law”. A consent to treatments should be 
necessary, to possibly refuse them.71 Then, as a single stream, self-determination became an 
autonomous right in the ItCC case law.72 This evolution had important consequences. While the 
meaning of heath extended moving from the organic functionality of the body to psychological 
 
under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall 
be ensured in the definition and implementation of all the Union’s policies and activities”. 
69 B. PEZZINI, Il diritto alla salute. Profili costituzionali, in Diritto e società, 1985, 42-43. 
70 For a distinction between mandatory obligations and coactive obligations in ItCC case law concerning Art. 32 
It. Const., on health, and Art. 13 It. Const., on personal liberty and integrity of the body, M. CARTABIA, La 
giurisprudenza costituzionale relativa all’art. 32, secondo comma, della Costituzione italiana, in Quad. cost., no. 
2, 2012, 455-465, spec. 456-460. 
71 E. ROSSI, Profili giuridici del consenso informato: i fondamenti costituzionali e gli ambiti di applicazione, in 
Rivistaaic.it, 2011, 6, who describes consent like a hinge between the negative dimension and the positive 
dimension of the right to health, i.e., the negative right to refuse actions of third parties causing damages and 
the positive right to ask for assistance and access to healthcare; in details, if mandatory medical treatments 
must be imposed only by law, all other treatments are voluntary, thus conditioned to consent. G.U. RESCIGNO, 
Dal diritto di rifiutare un determinato trattamento sanitaria secondo l’art. 32, c. 2, Cost., al principio di 
autodeterminazione intorno alla propria vita, in Diritto pubblico, 2008, 85 ff., spec. 91, insists on the fact that, 
to allow refusal, consent must be informed, i.e. imply a clear and qualified information. On the obligation of a 
qualified information as an essential attribute of consent, B. PEZZINI, Il diritto alla salute. Profili costituzionali, 
cit., 42-43. Following S. RODOTÀ, Il nuovo habeas corpus: la persona costituzionalizzata e la sua 
autodeterminazione, in S. RODOTÀ, M. TALLACCHINI (eds.), Ambito e fonti del Biodiritto, in S. RODOTÀ, P. ZATTI (eds.), 
Trattato di Biodiritto, Milano, 2010, 177, Art. 32.2 introduced a sort of new habeas corpus, parallel to the 
protection of physical integrity under Art. 13 It. Const. For these and more references, see A. CARMINATI, Libertà 
di cura e autonomia del medico. Profili costituzionali, cit., 24 ff., who emphasises that self-determination, and 
consent, is part of the right to physical integrity of our own body, protected by Art. 13 It. Const. 
72 Self-determination was born “in the shadow” of the right to health and the two proceeded together as travel 
companions for A. SANTOSUOSSO, Autodeterminazione e diritto alla salute. Da compagni di viaggio a difficili 
conviventi, in Notizie di Politeia, 1997, 27 ff. The leading cases are ItCC no. 438 of 2008 and no. 253 of 2009. In 
no. 438 of 2008 the independence of self-determination from health became clear. The autonomy of self-
determination is evident in the case law of civil courts concerning medical treatments, where failure to collect 
consent, as an infringement of the right to self-determination, gives cause for compensation claims per se. On 
the relation between science and law in ItCC case law under a comparative perspective, deeply S. PENASA, 
Presupposti scientifici delle leggi e giudizio di costituzionalità: spunti dal diritto comparato, in M. D’AMICO, F. 
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integrity, self-determination now comprehends personal aspects such as sexual identity, religious 
beliefs, different views on the beginning of life, education, self-development, the meaning of social 
relationships, and solidarity. Informed consent is in a way the bridge between the health river and 
the single stream of self-determination, giving protection to the whole complex of subjective 
aspirations and emotions that the physical dimension evokes.73 Overall, a subjective perception of 
health emerged, parallel to its objective meaning. 
10. (continue) The right not to know under Italian constitutional law 
The question is whether the described constitutional framework fits with the challenges of secondary 
findings. Certainly, express reference made by Art. 32.2 It. Const. to the right to refuse treatments, 
combined with the constitutional right to self-determination, offers a secured, stable foundation to 
“the right not to know”, as a negative expression of liberty. Italian Law no. 219 of 2017, under Art. 1, 
Informed consent, par. 3 states that every person “can refuse all or part of information or designate 
family members or a person of trust to receive them and give consent if this is the will of the 
patient”. 
However, the only anchor of self-determination may not be enough to set the issue. As the scholars 
have already demonstrated, genome information implies a strong relation between the individual 
and those who belong to the same family line. Genome holds messages that project the person back 
to the past and forward to the future horizontally and vertically.74 So, the genome does not go along 
an individual dimension, but a relational dimension. This understanding has significant consequences 
in organising genomic information between the single person and the other family member. Then, a 
self-determination model that focuses on the individual as an isolated subject seems not to consider 
all the interests involved. 
We could rephrase the problem from another constitutional viewpoint. If we select consent and the 
right to self-determination as the only parameter driving the right to know or not to know secondary 
findings, the risk is to approach the issue using a model like a very ancient freedom, the right to 
property. In this sense too, Italian constitutional evolution could be useful. Since the sixties of the 
past century the relation between each person and his or her body was questioned. The traditional 
paradigm, emerging from the liberal approach, considered this relation regarding property. The right 
of property was the model on which is still based, for example, Italian Civil Code of 1942, Art. 5, 
forbidding acts of disposition of his own body causing a permanent reduction of physical integrity, or 
opposing the law, public order or common decency. This model recalls dominion and all powers to 
use and abuse things within the limits of the law. After the entry into force of the Italian Constitution 
in 1948, many years passed before lawyers and judges finally changed paradigm. In the sixties of 
nineteen centuries, a joint reflection was undertaken between civil law and constitutional law 
scholars, and the result was a re-definition of this relation of person to his or her body regarding 
 
73 A. CARMINATI, Libertà di cura e autonomia del medico. Profili costituzionali, cit., 34. 
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responsibility and solidarity towards others.75 Art. 2 It. Const. associates the inviolable rights of each 
human and the fundamental duties of solidarity. Art. 3 It. Const. recognises equal social dignity, and 
states that it is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature 
that constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the 
human person and the effective participation in the political, economic and social organisation. 
Overall, freedom and equality both design the path of self-realisation and personal achievement in a 
relational context, associating freedom to solidarity and responsibility.76 This seems to be the 
complete set of parameters fitting with genetics and the issue of secondary findings. In this sense, 
two interrelated positive aspects of “the right not to know” emerge, the first concerning the 
protection of family members, as we said, and the second dealing with the obligations to make the 
freedom of choice effective, regarding consent. 
10. Right not to know and family members 
We have seen in the first part of this paper that one of the main objections to “the right not to know” 
concerns responsibility towards others, first family members. Clarification should be made on the 
meaning of family. Certainly, family entails bloodline. Somehow genetics moves the concept of family 
counter current, focusing on bloody “natural” family, whose human relationship could lack affection 
and common will, while legal and constitutional protection has evolved concerning the social 
meaning of family. Definitively, due to the hereditary nature of genes, genetic information is relevant 
to relatives. So relatives could entail the same health risks and should have the possibility to access 
available health remedies, and to change way of life and behaviours as well.77 Also, family 
comprehends, under constitutional meaning, spouses or partners, whose involvement could be 
opportune for example in reproductive choices, opening strong questions on the protection of future 
children.78 Here we leave aside the situation of spouses and partners and we limit our analysis to the 
bloodline family. Both from a theoretical viewpoint and in practise, “the right not to know” cannot 
supersede the rights of family members. 
In the autonomy approach mentioned above, the right to refuse knowledge is not absolute. As a 
relative right, it should be restricted when disclosure to the individual is necessary to avoid serious 
 
75 R. ROMBOLI, La libertà di disporre del proprio corpo: art. 5, in Commentario del Codice civile Scialoja-Branca, 
Roma, 1988; ID. (ed.), U. BRESCIA, A. PIZZORUSSO, Atti di disposizione del proprio corpo, Pisa, 2007, collecting the 
acts of the third joint seminar of the Doctoral School of Private Law and the Doctoral School of Constitutional 
Justice and Fundamental Rights. See more broadly, P. VERONESI, Il corpo e la costituzione, Concretezza dei casi e 
astrattezza della norma, Milano, 2007. 
76 M. TOMASI, Genetica e Costituzione, cit., 32, 48. Genetic information are truly intertwining lives in S. RODOTÀ, 
La vita e le regole, Milano, 2006, 71. 
77 Due to the relational nature of genetic information, some ethicists argue that the concept of genetic privacy 
is a contradiction in terms, in R. ANDORNO, op. cit., 437, referring to A. SOMMERVILLE, English v. Genetic Privacy: 
orthodoxy or oxymoron? in Journal of Medical Ethics, 25, 1999, 144-150. 
78 On reproductive issue in bioethical perspective, for example N. JUTH, The Right Not to Know and the Duty to 
Tell: The Case of Relatives, in Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 1, 2014, Special Issue, 38-52, and references 
to R. RHODES, Genetic Links, Family Ties and Social Bonds: Rights and Responsibilities in the Face of Genetic 
Knowledge, in Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 23, 1, 1998, 10-30; T. TAKALA, M. HÄYRY, Genetic Ignorance, 
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harm to family members, because some form of prevention or treatment is available.79 Similarly, 
Italian Constitutional Court case law, since the first judgement in 1956, admitted that any right under 
Italian Constitution is not absolute, all rights and interests need to strike a fair balance.80 
U.S. Guidelines, since the original version of 2013, have always considered patients together with 
family members. Variants with a higher likelihood of causing the disease are treated as potentially 
involving family from the pre-test counselling to the return, interpretation and communication of 
results. IFs are contextualised regarding personal and family history, in the awareness that further 
screening on relatives might be necessary. So, the interests of family members are a fully-fledged 
part of IFs’ discovery and communication strategies. Nevertheless, recommendations have not 
specified any formula to involve relatives, nor a way to balance the right to know of relatives with 
“the right not to know” of the patient. 
Under French Guidelines, reporting to patients’ relatives about genetic discovery of a primary or 
secondary variant in actionable genes is assumed not only as moral responsibility but also, in terms 
of French law, as legal duty for the proband.81 Because the disclosure to relatives can be particularly 
painful for families, even deleterious in some cases, French Guidelines state that how this 
information is given to relatives should be included in the informed consent to allow the patient a 
better understanding and consideration of the implications of results. An envisage solution is that the 
medical genetic team, if the patient so authorises, disclose the results to the family, thereby 
protecting as much as possible the patient’s anonymity. 
The Italian Report of the Bioethics Committee seems to recommend the option of disclosure to 
relatives as well. The pre-test counselling should give information about the consequences of 
eventual IFs on biological relationships and suggest that results could, and in some circumstance 
should, with proper precaution, be reported to family members in case of severe disease needing 
immediate interventions.82 
All the examined recommendations, obviously, do not analyse different sets of relations between the 
patient and his family, cooperative or conflicting. At a deep insight, it could be said that any problem 
 
79 R. ANDORNO, op. cit., 438. 
80 ItCC no. 1 of 1956, on limits as integral parts of rights; more recently, ItCC no. 85 of 2013, par. 9 Cons. dir., 
the ILVA case, concerning the conflict between safeguarding job conditions and pollution, on the lack of 
absoluteness of constitutional rights and the need for a fair balance between health, environmental protection, 
jobs, and private economic activity. 
81 The SFMPP Recommendations, cit., 1736, quoting M. TOURAINE, Décret no. 2013–527 relatif aux conditions de 
mise en œuvre de l’information de la parentèle dans le cadre d’un examen des caractéristiques génétiques à 
finalité médicale, in santéMdasedl (ed.), 20 June 2013. M. TOMASI, Genetica e Costituzione, cit., 120-121, 125, 
observes that only French legislation concerning genetic data, without mentioning specifically SFs, provides a 
duty of communication to relatives, and the patient may ask the clinician to disclose information to remain 
anonymous. Comparatively, in most legal systems, regulation of the issue is not provided by legislation, but by 
soft laws and in the circle of practitioners’ autonomy. 
82 Report Gestione degli “incidental findings”, cit., 18: “Le persone che si sottopongono al test devono, inoltre, 
essere informate che i risultati dell’analisi possono avere importanti implicazioni per i loro familiari e che, in 
questo caso, è opportuno, in certe circostanze doveroso, consentire a questi ultimi, con le dovute cautele e 
modalità, di venirne a conoscenza” and note no. 38, about a duty of communication: “Ad esempio nel caso di 
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concerning “the right not to know” does not arise when relatives could be autonomously involved in 
testing. In this situation, each adult individual will decide, independent of the others, about the 
opportunity to be tested and will eventually exercise “the right not to know”. The main issue 
concerns situations where the patient has to discover genetic information because, if information is 
not made available, relatives unable to be personally investigated would suffer serious harm. In this 
case, a first way to facilitate communication goes with information and persuasion of the patient 
himself. It means explanation of the family nature of genomic information and encouragement of 
family involvement and discussion. This informal approach depends on counselling and consent, as 
we will see in the next paragraph.83 If this approach is not useful, or not possible in the circumstances 
of the case, we argue that a mandatory involvement of family members is required, and that family 
members should be contacted, whenever possible, even against the will of the patient. As we said, 
family members should have the same opportunity for pre-test evaluation and information, and they 
are entitled to the same opt-in opt-out option. If their personal testing is not viable, certainly their 
need for protection may affect and endanger “the right not to know” of the patient.84 This seems to 
be the main limit to the exercise of this right. In our opinion, this conclusion complies with the 
constitutional pattern described above, where self-determination goes with solidarity and 
responsibility. 
11. The positive side of the right not to know: Consent 
Positive obligation as a side of “the right not to know” relies essentially on consent. It is already well 
acquired that consent is not a single act, but a procedure. Its centrality being assumed, in recent 
years’ literature specified its limits. Attempts are made to avoid consent as a mere ritual, a form to 
fill out to defend practitioners, rather than protect patients.85 All the examined guidelines insist on 
the need and centrality of pre-test and post-test extensive counselling by the clinician who knows the 
 
83 This is a “responsibility-generating factor” approach for M. TOMASI, Genetica e Costituzione, cit., 119. 
84 This is in fact the solution provided for in the Italian DPA general authorisation. Compared to the first version 
in 2007, since 2011 the authorisation has been revised in the light of ongoing experience and experts’ opinions 
to allow the processing and communication of genetic data indispensable to family members for health 
protection purposes without the consent of the data subject. The current text of the authorisation no. 146 of 
2019, cit., provides that the results of a genetic test may be communicated to members of the same genetic 
line at their request when the data subject consented or when it is essential to avoid harm to their health, 
including reproductive risk, and the data subject’s consent is not given or cannot be given due to unavailability 
(par. 4.6). Furthermore, par. 4.7 is expressly dedicated to the protection of the health of third parties and 
provides that if the consent of the data subject is not given or cannot be given due to physical impossibility, 
incapacity or unavailability, the processing of genetic data and their communication may be carried out when it 
is indispensable to enable the third party to make an informed reproductive choice or is justified by the need 
for preventive or therapeutic measures. 
85 G. CALABRESI, Reflections on medical experimentation in humans, in Dedalus, Journal of the American Academy 
of Arts and Science, 98, 1969, 405, considering that, as an academic, informed consent seemed to strike the 
best balance between different interests, while as a judge it was completely insufficient, because beyond the 
sheets of paper, people face showed they did not know what happened at all. [My apology if this quotation is 
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patient’s physical conditions, history and expectations, with the help of geneticists or other 
consultants.86 
The U.S. and Italian Recommendations do not set a specific procedure for the exercise of “the right 
not to know” SFs. In contrast, French Guidelines adopt a new scheme, the so-called double consent, 
which seems an interesting solution related to secondary findings.87 The major point of this 
procedure is to respect the patient’s desire to know or ignore results. 
Briefly, double consent means that a first informed consent about the possibility of SFs is given 
during the initial medical procedure, motivating the primary genetic analysis. A second informed 
consent form is offered after the announcement of the primary findings, so that the patient could, 
with more autonomy, differentiate the issues and confirm or refuse access to this information. 
Information and informed consent must mention the medical impact of SFs on relatives. The clinical 
utility (regarding screening and prevention), for personal and family reasons, of a secondary 
discovery of a pathogenic variant within an actionable gene must be explained to the patient and 
counterbalanced by the arguments against this information. Because of the possibility to reconsider 
the given decision, SFs should be reported in a second report independent of the primary findings. 
Two features characterise this formula. First, the dissociation of consent, and independence of the 
reports, concerning the primary investigation and secondary results. The need to dissociate the 
announcement of the primary findings from that of SFs was supported by patient associations to 
limit the psychological impact generated. Second, the role of time. Time is given, between the first 
and the second, confirmatory consent, to better understand and reflect. The main idea is a period of 
reflection, leaving the opportunity for patients to express their opinion again.88 
Recent Italian Law no. 219 of 2017 on free and informed consent also emphasises the importance of 
time. Art. 8 states that the time of communication between the clinician and the patient represents 
the time of medical care [“Il tempo della comunicazione tra medico e paziente costituisce tempo di 
cura”]. And precisely in giving effectiveness to “time” comprises, in our opinion, the positive 
obligation, the active side of “the right not to know”. Previous references to positive and negative 
 
86 The Italian Bioethics Committee’s Report, for example, suggests the support of a psychologist in the pre-test 
counselling. Communication of IFs is for the clinician ordering the examination, due to the trust relation with 
the patient, but participation of other consultants is envisaged to better explain the results and their 
implications and to help plan next clinical steps. Outside the doctor-patient relationship, the Italian Committee 
insists properly on the need for extension of practitioners’ competences in genetic counselling, including 
communication’s abilities, and, more generally, for the implementation of school programmes and educational 
initiative on genetic issues, to improve knowledge of basic concepts of genetics, increase consciousness and 
the ability to form personal opinions. The U.S. Guidelines too mainly entrust the doctor-patient relationship 
with great flexibility. 
87 M. TOMASI, Genetica e Costituzione, cit., 254-287, analyses different models of consent, occurred over time to 
overcome the conditions of specificity and actuality required in traditional consent, like blanket consent, 
sectoral consent, multi-layered or dynamic consent, this latter suitable to communicate IFs. 
88 See in detail the diagram in Figure no. 3, Recommended steps for reporting secondary findings to the patient, 
in SFMPP Recommendations, cit., 1737. The second SFs consent, proposed during the reporting of primary 
findings, should also be offered again to patients who have stated in the first consent that they did not want to 
know the SFs. Thus, as for all patients, these patients will have the right to return to the decision after a period 
of reflection. Even if no formal pilot experiment of such a double consent was performed by the group, this 






































108 Alessia-Ottavia Cozzi 
BioLaw Journal – Rivista di BioDiritto, Special Issue 1/2021 
aspects of freedom are useful to argue, at the end, that the fulfilment of the right to know or not to 
know requires a specific, positive intervention to implement appropriate organisational measures. 
Literature on consent fosters dialogue and relational dimensions to overcome patients’ constitutive 
asymmetry, scientific incompetence, and vulnerability. Reference is made to a dynamic process, 
scientifically comprehensive, devoid of technicalities, suited to the sociocultural conditions of the 
patient, and humanly sensitive.89 Educational, financial and organisational investments are necessary 
to achieve those objectives. It has been specified that, under Italian Law on consent, the 
representation of time for information as part of the medical process remains a mere statement, 
because any budget has been allocated to implement it. Actually, there could not be time if 
structures and staff are not reinforced to perform ordinary tasks dealing with other duties.90 Once 
again, “the right not to know” demonstrates that negative liberty is empty if it is not surrounded by 
measures and resources that make the opportunity of choice available, regarding understanding and 
affordability. 
12. Conclusions: Double consent as a nudge 
The paper overviewed the IFs issue from the clinicians’ perspective, about actionability, and the 
patients’ perspective, on “the right not to know”, discussing two main theoretical rationales, 
autonomy and privacy, and moving from the US debate on positive and negative liberty to the French 
and Italian experiences. Concerning the pretension to refuse knowledge, the position of family 
members was analysed as the main limit to the individual right of choice. Furthermore, we argued 
that, to collect all interest, the negative exercise of the right not to know should rely on positive 
measures, shaping the procedure of consent. 
As we said before, there is a certain degree of paternalism either in avoiding knowledge, assuming 
that patient cannot understand the choice or cannot bear the pain, or in the duty to inform and the 
obligation to know, as the only way to make choices and control circumstances of life. The double 
consent formula suggested by the French Guidelines in 2018 seems a good procedural attempt to 
strike a balance. During the works of the SFMMP, a short animation movie was promoted to explain 
to the public the issue of secondary findings and to disseminate recommendations.91 The movie is 
centred on the patient, a little puppet, and accompanies him in a cosy atmosphere through hospital 
laboratories and counselling rooms to finally make the choice to have information or not. In a loyal 
and transparent way, it tends to suggest that knowledge of pathogenic variations could be useful to 
health. Can we consider this formula as a nudge, a small push, in the meaning of Thaler and 
 
89 See L. PALAZZANI, Informed Consent, Experimentation and Emerging Ethical Problems, in this Review, Special 
Issue, 1, 2019, I-Consent. Improving the Guidelines for Informed Consent, Including Vulnerable Population, 
Under a Gender Perspective, 11-22, spec. 16-18, where “time to reflect” is part of the suggested ethical 
requirements. I-Consent focuses on research, but many recommendations are suitable for clinical settings. 
90 See A. CARMINATI, Libertà di cura e autonomia del medico. Profili costituzionali, cit., 171. 
91 The animation movie, in French and English, is very useful to disseminate the issue, 
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Sunstein?92 A nudge is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour 
predictably without forbidding any options.93 Nudges are everywhere, and push every minimal 
decision, but unthinkingly, as in advertisement. The authors explained that every day, we make 
decisions on topics ranging from school, education, meals and health, and we are susceptible to 
various biases. People make good choices in contexts in which they have experience, good 
information, and prompt feedback. They do less well in contexts in which they are inexperienced and 
poorly informed, and in which feedback is slow or infrequent. Choice architecture, both good and 
bad, is pervasive and unavoidable, and it greatly affects personal decisions. Therefore, the authors 
argued that public and private actors can design choice environments that make it easier for people 
to choose what is best for themselves, their families and society, without restricting freedom of 
decision. “Good nudges” could be “built” to drive people to appropriate decisions for themselves and 
their families. Particularly, people need nudges for decisions that are difficult and rare, for which 
they do not get prompt feedback, and when they have trouble translating aspects of the situation 
into terms that they can easily understand. Health is liable to be a choice environment. Doctors are 
presented as crucial choice architects, and with an understanding of how humans think, they could 
do far more to improve people’s health. The authors’ principal claim is that patients and doctors 
should be free to make their own agreements and that doctors’ task is to help patients to map 
opportunities and to understand which option fits better with his personal wellbeing.94 Thaler and 
Sunstein called themselves libertarian paternalists, suggesting that not only government, but 
employers, management boards, universities, clubs and single families could adopt measures to 
nudge members towards choices that will increase their wellbeing. They claimed that libertarian 
paternalism is not an oxymoron, because choice architects can preserve freedom of choice while also 
nudging people in directions that will improve their lives.95 
This theory has been criticised exactly because of paternalism, and it is worth recalling that it moves 
from an economic framework, denying that consumer and client are rational agents. In fact, French 
Guidelines seem to be a real nudge in the sense of Thaler and Sunstein because they try to strike 
actionability, so high possibility of health measures, with the more intimate desire of patients about 
themselves, leaving them the final decision. Actually, concerning secondary findings, it is hard to find 
a settlement that is not, in some way, paternalistic, being constant the risk of applying one personal 
idea of rationality or wellbeing. In the end, a procedure divided into steps, bringing out different 
shades, based on time, allowing reflection, and preserving freedom, seems, in this complex pattern, a 
good solution to consider. 
 
92 R. THALER, C.R. SUNSTEIN, Nudge, Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness, Yale University 
Press, 2008, La spinta gentile. La nuova strategia per migliorare le nostre decisioni su denaro, salute, felicità, 
trad. it. A. Oliveri, Milano, 2009 [VIII ed. 2018]. 
93 Ibid., 9. 
94 Ibid., 102. 
95 Ivi. 
